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CENTRALL HA	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Legislative Counsel Washington, D. C. 20505 Telephone: 8 March 1978
TO:	Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate S-116, The Capitol Washington, D.C. 20510
	ATTENTION: Bill Ashworth Dear Bill,
	passed on your request for information on Soviet ballistic missile sub- marines. I am forwarding a copy of the Aviation Week article along with a one-page memorandum, which I hope will provide the answers you wanted. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I can be of further assistance.
	Sincerely.
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Russians have two more boats at sea than permitted under interim offensive agreement; three more ready to deploy

By Clarence A. Robinson, Jr.

Washington-Soviet Union is operating 64 ballistic missile submarines in violation of the interim offensive agreement that binds both sides pending completion of the second strategic arms limitation accord now being negotiated in Geneva.

Under the interim pact, the USSR is permitted 62 ballistic missile boats with an aggregate 950 launchers. The interim agreement expired Oct. 3, 1977, but both sides said they would respect it until it is replaced with a new agreement.

In addition to the 64 ballistic missile submarines already at sea, the Soviets have three Delta class submarines outfittted and ready to put to sea. That is partially the reason why the official Soviet newspaper, Pravda, recently called for a rapid conclusion of the SALT 2 treaty, U.S. strategic arms experts said. One official of the Administration of President Jimmy Carter said that with the limit in the SALT 1 accord, "the Russians are shackled because they are moving more and more of their nuclear armed missiles to sea, phasing out older ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], and they are stymied until SALT 2 is ratified."

Under the proposed SALT 2 agreement based on the Vladivostok framework, it would not be necessary to dismantle or destroy older ICBMs in order to increase SLBMs, provided that the aggregate limit of 2,400 strategic delivery systems-ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and heavy bombers-or the sublimit of missiles with multiple independently retargetable vehicles is not exceeded, a Defense official told Congress.

U.S. officials said that in addition to the Delta submarines now at sea, there are another six or seven Hotel class boats being operated that also are over the limit in SALT 1. "Part of the problem is that the Soviets said they were dismantling some of the older ballistic missile submarines, but there is no real move on their part to do that," another U.S. official said.

"This is just another example of the Russian characteristic to see how far they can push until we call them on it," the official added. "It was only a year or so back when we had to demand that they dismantle some SS-7 and SS-8 ICBM launchers to compensate for submarines armed with ballistic missile launchers [AW&ST May 31, 1976, p. 14; May 24, 1976, p. 20].

"They were in violation of the interim treaty then," the official added.

The protocol to the interim agreement permitted both the U.S. and USSR to increase the size of submarine-launched ballistic missile forces-from 656 to 710 on 44 boats for the U.S. and from 740 to the 950 on 62 submarines for the USSR. But any improproved Four Robbeas 2006/ under construction on the date of the SALT I agreement required dismantling and destruction of ICBM launchers on a one-for-one basis.

"It was clearly a part of SALT 1 and understood by both sides that Hotel boats would be counted," one U.S. strategic arms expert said. "Now, however, the U.S. has waffled on that item, and it is unclear just what we are counting."

Gen. George S. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Congress this month that "the Soviet ballistic missile submarine force continues to grow in size and capability, a reflection of its high priority. As of Jan. 1, 1978, the Soviets had almost 900 submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers on SSBNs in opertional status. There are additional launchers on SSBNs, which are fitting out, on sea trials or under construction. There also

Backfire Issue

Washington-Soviet Union's Tupolev Backfire bomber is expected to be eliminated from any formal treaty arrangement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union as part of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) 2.

Congressional staff members said U.S. negotiators have agreed to a Soviet bargaining position that the Backfire be handled in a separate written statement to be issued by the Kremlin leadership that assures the bomber will not be deployed as a threat against the U.S., and that the monthly production rate will not be increased.

At the same time, the U.S. also would issue a statement that would present conflicting views concerning the Backfire. "None of the Soviet so-called collateral restraints are verifiable," a congressional staffer said.

Sen. John Tower (R.-Tex.), a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said he is dissatisfied with State Dept. explanations concerning the Backfire issue. "The Soviet Backfire bomber has strategic capability," he said, after meeting with State Dept. officials. "It is undeniable. I will not be a party to any are launchers on older diesel units, are not accountable under the S interim agreement."

In response to an Aviation WE SPACE TECHNOLOGY query, the De Dept. said that the Soviet Union wasating, as of Jan. 1, the following nur of submarines:

Yankee class nuclear-powered armed with 16 SS-N-6 ballistic mi with a range of 2,400-3,000 km. vessels. >=

■ Delta class boats-27. This is a of both the 12-launcher Delta I and 16-launcher Delta 2. Both vessels are armed with the SS-N-8 missile wi 7,800-km. range.

Other older ballistic missile sul rines-30. This includes nuclear-pow Hotel boats that are armed with three N-5s each. The missile has a rang 1,300 km.

N Cruise missile submarines −65.

Attack submarines—195.

Defense Secretary Harold Brown the Soviet SLBM force continues undergo both expansion and modern tion. Construction of the Yankee-o submarine stopped at 34 boats with launchers. "However, we believe the new solid-fuel missile with a posi-b vehicle, greater accuracy and range-SS-NX-17-may be backfitted into s or all of the Yankees. To date, only unit has been so fitted," Brown said.

He added that "the Soviets now har total of 27 Delta submarines. The Deit and 2s carry the SS-N-8, a single-warh missile with a range of at least 7,800 A new submarine, the Delta 3, is undergoing sea trials. The Soviets are testing the SS-NX-18-a very long-ra liquid post-boost vehicle and up to the MIRVs.

Both the SS-N-8 and the SS-NX will permit the Soviets to cover tar located in the U.S. from patrol areas distant as the Barents Sea and the wa of the North Pacific. With the SS-N the Soviets already have a system greater range than the Trident 1," Bro explained.

The Delta 3 has 24 launchers.

One of the major problems facing U.S. Navy today is obsolescence of Poseidon fleet ballistic missile force. normal 20-year life of some Poscidons being extended to 25 years, but even w that there will be a significant reduction U.S. SLBM launch tubes in the 1980s

"Since the Polaris/Poseidon force v built at a faster rate than that planned Trident, with a 20-year service life, U.S. would encounter a low level of 3

delusions to the Gentla M00980R0020000 4 do 4 7 agnichers in 1986 as compared

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Additional considerations are the role SLBMs will play in the future U.S. mix of strategic forces.

"However, potential force levels can be inferred based upon current SLBM levels or potential SALT 2 outcomes. Should significant strategic arms reductions occur, it is possible that a MIRV limit which reflects current levels could be imposed. In this case, our current level of 496 MIRVed SLBM launchers would equate to 21 Trident submarines. Adherence to the extended interim strategic arms limitation agreement with its limit of 710 SLBM launchers could be accommodated with 29 Trident submarines or 696 Trident launchers. Finally, some unidentified share of a SALT 2 accord MIRV limit will be allocated to MIRVed SLBM launchers."

The Soviet Union is stressing to U.S. SALT negotiators in Geneva that when the new agreement is signed the USSR does not expect to scale down its present force of strategic delivery vehicles to meet the imposed ceiling until 1981 or 1982.

"This would be after the expiration of the three-year protocol if the agreement is concluded and ratified in this year," one Administration official said, "and it gives them awesome political leverage to extend the protocol with favorable terms in an agreement. They have told us privately at the negotiating level that they would abrogate the treaty (SALT 2) if the protocol is not extended."

B-1 Defeat

Washington-Long congressional battle to retain funding for aircraft 5 and 6 of the USAF/Rockwell International B-1 bomber ended last week when the House voted to rescind \$462 million previously appropriated for Fiscal 1977.

The final House vote of 234 to 182 marked the largest margin for anti-B-1 proponents in the House in a recent series of floor actions and agreed with a Feb. 1 Senate vote to pass a rescission amendment upholding the decision of President Jimmy Carter to terminate B-1 production (awast Feb. 6, p. 24).

The House action ended a protracted see-saw congressional battle that began last year when the Administration's decision to kill the B-1 was challenged by pro-B-1 forces to retain aircraft 5 and 6. While B-1 opponents maintained that the bomber was not cost effective, B-1 advocates stressed that the aircraft was vital to retain a strategic bomber production capability in the U.S. defense posture.

While the House vote effectively terminated the aircraft's production, research and development funds for the B-1 would continue to be spent.

SSBN forces as a result of aging and technique west received by the second seco To Change SALT Pact

Washington-Soviet Union, through its official government newspaper, P warning the U.S. that efforts to retouch or improve the second strategic arms agreement now being negotiated in Geneva could have serious consequence outcome of a treaty.

The delay in concluding the SALT 2 agreement is discussed by Pravda in an unusual article on prospects and problems related to the negotiations.

The USSR government organ cited forces in the U.S. it claims are operating to retard conclusion of the treaty. Calling them opponents of detente, it said the figures, whom it identified as retired highranking military men, specialist theorists on strategic issues, bodies like the "socalled Committee on the Present Danger, and certain press organs playing the role of direct advocates for the Pentagon and military-industrial complex, openly oppose any arms limitation agreement with the USSR and are urging the build-up of military efforts and the securing of military supremacy over the USSR."

The Soviet Union, Pravda said, will not accept any retouching taking place in specific areas of the agreement by these

opponents. The areas include:

Cruise missiles.

■ Verification (monitoring observance of the treaty).

= New strategic systems and modernization of existing systems.

· Backfire bomber.

Neutron bomb deployment.

Pravda said the U.S. admits that longrange cruise missiles are strategic weapons and must be subject to limitation with other strategic systems, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarinelaunched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers.

"The sides eventually agreed that airto-surface cruise missiles with ranges from 600 km. to 2,500 km. must be limited," Pravda explained. "It was agreed to equate heavy bombers equipped with such missiles to strategic missiles with MIRVed [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle] warheads and to count such bombers within the fixed ceiling of 1,320 such carriers on each side. As for air-tosurface cruise missiles with ranges over 2,500 km., these are subject to complete

Agreement also was reached on sealaunched and surface-launched cruise missiles with ranges over 600 km. "It is intended that the testing and deployment of these weapons be banned initially for a period of three years, to give the sides further time to find a final solution," according to Pravda.

The official newspaper added that it seemed that everything was clear and that nical one of formulating those de appropriate treaty language."

Advocates of retouching the a then went into action, Pravi declaring that this is a totally u concession in the USSR's favor, to effectively emasculate the agr

The argument was offered by t that cruise missiles could be dep virtually any type of aircraft, i transports.

"In practice, this would make the emergence of an unlimited and cally uncontrolled number of loaded with dozens of long-range missiles and possessing the same tive force as the nuclear warh ICBMs and submarine-launched missiles," Pravda zdded.

The effect would make the t "mere scrap of paper rather th understanding aimed at preventi clear war. The Soviet Union will its signature to such a scrap of pap

Pravda stated that the oppone SALT 2 are also seeking to remove tions from sea- and surface-las cruise missiles and called it a attempt to insure that, after the thre protocol to the treaty ends, there we freedom to develop cruise missile increase their range above the 60 "and ultimately to retain the possib deploying them outside the L

Fuel Efficiency Studie

Studies on a fuel-efficient light-turb powered automobile will be underta by Williams Research Corp., Wa Lake, Mich., under a \$405,000 con from National Aeronautics and Sp Administration's Lewis Resea

Williams, manufacturer of light tur fan engines, will act as prime contra on the program, doing engine perfo ance studies leading toward an e neering development phase for a veh by 1983, AM General Corp., Southf Mich.; Is getting \$114,000 to prov Williams with vehicle and vehicle syste engineering support.

Design objectives include a 2 improvement in power train efficier and at least a 20% improvement in : economy from a 1976 Environmen Protection Agency-rated compact car the 3,100-lb, weight class.

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Washington-Initial deployment of the Russian three-stage mobile SS-16 intercontinental ballistic missile is under way in fixed-site silos in the Soviet Union. U.S. officials last week said that while the missile is expected to be deployed in a mobile mode on erecter/läunchers at a later date, limited numbers are now operational in silos.

Defense Secretary Harold Brown told Congress recently the Soviets have essentially completed development of "a fourth ICBM-the SS-16-which we believe to be intended as a landmobile system, although it can be placed in silos. It is a solidfuel, three-stage missile with a post-boost vehicle. However, it currently carries a single warhead."

Brown added that the SS-20, a mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile that consists of the first two stages of the SS-16, is already deployed (AW&ST Jan. 2, p. 13).

"We estimate it has a range of at least 3,000 km. and can carry three MIRVs to that distance," he said. "We estimate that it will replace or augment the current force of medium-range ballistic missiles and IRBM launchers and that, with a successful multiple refire capability, it could provide roughly three times the number of warheads of the older force.

"In addition, the Soviets have a fifth generation of ICBMs in development, estimated to consist of four missiles. Flight testing of one or two of these missiles could begin at any time, with the others following by the early 1930s."

The Soviet Union continues to exploit the interim offensive SALT 1 agreement with deployment of ICBMs. These include:

Converting SS-9 launchers for the SS-18. There are now approximately 100 SS-18s operational in silos, and work is continuing on others. The U.S. expects all SS-9 silos-to be converted for the SS-18. There are three variations of the ICBM, and all three are expected to be deployed. The cold-launch

missile is ejected from its silo by a gas generator (AWAST Feb. 4, 1974, p. 14) and the main boosters fire. As a result, the silo is not damaged and can be reloaded. The Mod 1 and 3 of the SS-18 have a single reentry vehicle, and the Mod 2 can accommodate eight to 10 reentry vehicles. The Mod 3 has greater range than the other two and is more accurate than the Mod 1.

■ Deployment of more than 60 SS-17s now operational in converted SS-11 silos. Other conversions to accommodate the SS-17 are in progress. The conversion pace of the SS-17 is running slower than the U.S. anticipated. Conversions are expected to be limited at each launch complex to avoid having too many SS-11s off line at one time. The MiRVed version with four warheads is operational in some silos. Since it has been tested with MIRVs, all SS-17 silos will be counted as MIRVed.

Conversions of SS-11 siles to the SS-19. More than 200 SS-19s are now operational, with additional SS-11 silos under conversion. The SS-19 can carry six reentry vehicles, and a single reentry vehicle is now being tested on the weapon. All SS-19 silos count as MIRVed. ı

Referring to the SS-16, Gen. George Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Congress this month: "They have apparently decided not to deploy it in the mobile mode at this time. They may be expected to continue mobile ICBM development efforts to further their technology in this area."

"An even more serious question centers on Soviet deployment of the MIRVed SS-20 mobile IRBM and the relationship of that system (which is outside the SALT parameters so long as its range is less than 5,500 km.) to the SS-16, which is included in SALT," Gen. Brown continued. "The SS-20 comprises the first two stages of the three-stage SS-16. By upgrading SS-20 deployment to the SS-16, the Soviets could increase their mobile ICBM capability relatively quickly."

maximum service life is attained, the nadir will be 480 SLBM launchers in 1982," Navy officials said.

U.S. SLBM launcher levels have lagged the Soviet Union since the end of Fiscal 1974. "The combination of a steadily increasing Soviet SLBM force level, block obsolescence of the United States Polaris/Poseidon force, and a slow Trident ship-building rate clearly predicts a continued Soviet advantage in SLBM launchers, the most invulnerable element of each nation's strategic forces for the foreseeable future," Navy officials said.

Of the current force of 41 fleet ballistic submarines, which were commissioned between 1960 and 1967, the oldest is now 18 years old, and the Navy is experiencing increasing materiel maintenance costs. Navy officials told Congress: "The uncertainties associated with the technological obsolesence of these ships in the face of the increasing Soviet antisubmarine warfare threat, the increasing maintenance costs that we are experiencing, the inability to backfit modern noise reduction techniques and ship systems into these ships and the lack of growth room for future improvements in ship and missile systems make it inadvisable to plan on a service life much beyond 20 years."

The Navy is backfitting the Lockheed Trident 1 ballistic missile into a portion of the Poscidon for This d'in Release

survivability because of the resultant expanded operating area allowed by the missile's increased range, and will provide the ability to cover potential targets upon departure from the continental U.S. bases without the need for lengthy transits.

The Soviet Union is expected to build more than 90 new ballistic missile submarines by the 1990s, according to U.S. strategic weapons experts, and because the boats now being operated by the Russians will have a service life of only 12-15 years at that time, the U.S. cannot expect them to dismantle them, one Administration official said. There is a question about where the Soviets are going with the SLBM program, the official added.

"It is as difficult as the questions now

Israeli Fighter

Subcommittee of the Israeli Knesset defense committee has recommended that the country proceed with the development of a new air-superiority fighter. The subcommittee estimated development costs at \$450 million.

The recommendation is being opposed by several officials within the Israeli air force and finance ministry.

If the project is undertaken, it is expected that the fighter will be powered by non-U. S. engines.

being raised about the numbers of SLBMs the Soviets have at sea. Under the agreement, both sides count submarines as deployed when they begin sea trials. The question now has narrowed to when is a boat at sea trials.

"There is clearly a backlog of Soviet boats awaiting sea trials," the official added.

The U.S. believes the best way to insure survivability of the SLBM force is to keep a maximum percent of the boats at sea. Currently 72% of the Poseidon force is at sea, and the Navy plans to maintain 78% of the Trident force at sea. This will yield a 63% increase in missiles because the 24 launchers on Trident compare with the 16 on Poseidon boats.

The Trident 1 (C-4) ballistic missile is proceeding toward an October, 1979, operational availability date. There have been 11 flight tests with the missile from a pad at Cape Canaveral, Fla., and 10 have been successful. Operational deployment in the Poseidon is scheduled for late 1979.

"The ultimate Trident force level is under continual review," a Navy official said, "and will be influenced by several interrelated factors. Primary among these will be the outcome of the on-going SALT negotiations, which will cap the number of by non-U. S. engines:

MIR Ved strategic missiles the U. S. will

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